University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Business and Law

1-1-2006

The HIH collapse: a catalyst for costly reform
Gregor H. Allan
University of Wollongong, gregor@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allan, Gregor H.: The HIH collapse: a catalyst for costly reform 2006, 137-159.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/466

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The HIH collapse: a catalyst for costly reform
Abstract
This paper examines the corporate governance and audit law reforms wrought in the wake of recent
corporate scandals such as the HIH collapse. It considers the cost of these reforms and, using HIH as a
principle reference point, the likely benefits. In particular, it questions reforms in the areas of auditor
independence and audit standards. Do the new independence requirements go far enough? Does audit
practice regulation now go too far? Indeed, is the audit function inherently susceptible to legislated
sanction – or does this denigrate the very essence of auditing as a profession?

Keywords
HIH, collapse, catalyst, for, costly, reform

Disciplines
Law

Publication Details
G. H. Allan, ''The HIH collapse: a catalyst for costly reform'' (2006) 11 (2) Deakin Law Review 137-159.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/466

THE HIH COLLAPSE: A COSTLY
CATALYST FOR REFORM
GREGOR ALLAN∗
[This paper examines the corporate governance and audit law reforms
wrought in the wake of recent corporate scandals such as the HIH
collapse. It considers the cost of these reforms and, using HIH as a
principle reference point, the likely benefits. In particular, it questions
reforms in the areas of auditor independence and audit standards. Do
the new independence requirements go far enough? Does audit practice
regulation now go too far? Indeed, is the audit function inherently
susceptible to legislated sanction – or does this denigrate the very
essence of auditing as a profession?]
I

INTRODUCTION

The HIH collapse is not ‘a case where wholesale fraud or embezzlement
abounded’.1 Instead, it is a rather pathetic tale in which, to the great cost of
thousands of ordinary Australians, the unwary followed the inept further and
further toward predictable demise. By the time the group was wound-up on 27
August 2001, its deficiency was estimated at between $3.6 billion and $5.3
billion.2 Only two days later, a Royal Commission of Inquiry was established
to investigate the cause.
That this saga was allowed to unfold is as much a testament to poor corporate
governance as it is to any default on the part of the auditor, Arthur Andersen.
Yet recent legislative reforms, although in name targeting both ‘corporate

∗

Senior Lecturer and Head of Prosecutions Programme, Centre for Transnational
Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. The author gratefully
acknowledges the support of Dr Annamaria Kurtovic of the Forensic Accounting
Programme, Faculty of Commerce, University of Wollongong.
1
The HIH Royal Commission Report, ‘Reasons for the failure: A broad perspective’,
National Capital Printing, Canberra, 2003, available at
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/23212/20030418/www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/i
ndex.htm (last accessed December 2004). (Hereinafter referred to as Royal
Commission Report. As the report is unpaginated, references herein provide the
relevant section title in quotation marks.)
2
Royal Commission Report, ‘The failure of HIH: a critical assessment’.
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disclosure’ and ‘audit reform’, have weighed-in very heavily on the audit
reform side of the ledger – particularly in the area of auditor independence.
This paper discusses the profound changes to the profession that these reforms
will herald, including the splitting of audit and non-audit functions, increases
in public indemnity insurance, the incorporation of auditing entities (now
permitted) and the loss of several small firms hitherto sustained by a balanced
diet of auditing and advisory work. To the corporate sector, the cost of doing
business just got higher, particularly for listed companies: compliance costs –
ultimately to be borne by the shareholder – are set to increase dramatically.
Given the cost of reform, the likelihood of ensuing benefits calls for close
examination. This paper undertakes such an examination against the backdrop
of the HIH collapse. It is argued that new and convoluted auditorindependence provisions, in conjunction with the move to brace auditing
standards with the force of law, verge on ‘black-letter’ proscriptions that
obscure the very hallmark of professional practice – the ascription to an
overarching body of ethics. It is further argued that the standard of
independence now legislated tolerates market uncertainty and, accordingly,
falls well shy of the mark. Indeed, it is suggested that the entire thrust of the
reforms miss the most obvious target. An invariable modus operandi of the
corporate malfeasor is the deceptive, technical manipulation of accounting
and auditing standards, yet there is a growing body of accounting
professionals with little or no understanding of the application of the ‘true and
fair view’ requirement of financial reporting. If the auditing profession wishes
to avoid the slide to technocracy, it is argued that the ‘true and fair view’
requirement must be uncompromisingly reasserted as the ultimate financial
reporting standard – not lost amid the clamorous, technical detail of recent
reforms.
II
A

HIH: INEPTITUDE MASKED BY DECEIT

Ineptitude and the ‘shambling journey towards
oblivion’ 3

It is said that bad management and poor accounting cause most corporate
failures.4 The most striking testament to bad management at HIH was, without

3

This is the description applied to the HIH collapse by the Royal Commission: Royal
Commission Report, ‘The failure of HIH: a critical assessment’.
4
‘Over 50 percent of companies fail because of these two things’: John Spark, partner
at Ferrier Hodgson. To similar effect are the comments of George Lopez, partner with
insolvency specialist Melson Robson and chairperson of CPA Australia's Insolvency
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doubt, its chronic under-reserving. As the Royal Commission Report noted,
‘the largest single item on the balance sheet of the general insurer is the
provision that sets aside for payment of future claims’.5 In making this
provision, the HIH board relied upon reports of independent actuaries and
assessments of those reports by its auditor, Arthur Andersen (Andersen).
However, ‘at no time were the actuary reports or even a summary of them
tabled at meetings of the audit committee or board … nor was an actuary
asked to attend the meeting to explain his or her report or answer questions’.6
Indeed, the inefficacy of the HIH board is a theme that permeates the entire
Royal Commission report. The Commission noted that ‘there were no clearly
defined limits on the authority of the chief executive’ and that, as a result, in
some areas ‘the system was out of control and the board did not appreciate
it’.7 The board did not have ‘a well understood policy on matters that would
be reserved to itself … matters seem to have come forward at the discretion of
the chief executive’.8 The agenda for the board was ‘controlled by
management’.9
This abdication of directorial responsibility was itself a function of a doting,
but thoroughly blind, faith in the HIH management. Whilst a degree of
deference to the experience of senior management must undoubtedly attend a
board’s deliberations, the Royal Commission noted that ‘in the modern
commercial context [this] must be subject to the countervailing effect of close
review, debate and questioning … this appears to have been a commodity in
short supply at HIH’.10 The Commission appositely referred to a 1995 due
diligence report which described HIH as a company ‘struggling to make the
transition from an entrepreneurially run company influenced strongly by
senior management’ to an ‘ASX listed company run in the interests of
shareholders’.11 Worse still, the influence of senior management was
effectively institutionalised through the composition of both the board and the
audit committee. Amongst the S&P/ASX top 100 companies, independent

and Reconstruction Centre of Excellence: ‘the issue that comes up quite consistently
is the lack of information. The failure to keep proper records. It is not just necessarily
not having enough information but not having the right information’: , Both quoted in
Ed Charles and Trevor Murphy, ‘Bad company’ (2002) 72(7) Australian CPA 6.
5
Royal Commission Report, ‘The audit methodology’.
6
Royal Commission Report, ‘Under-provisioning: systemic problems’.
7
Royal Commission Report, ‘Limits of authority’.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Royal Commission Report, ‘Mismanagement: a particular outlook’.
11
Royal Commission Report, ‘A private company approach’.
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non-executive directors comprise on average 45.3 percent of the board; in
stark contrast, there were no independent non-executive directors on the HIH
board.12 Of the four non-executive directors, two were former partners of
Andersen and two were involved in providing legal services to the group.13
Nor did HIH have a single independent director on the audit committee; by
contrast, in 54 percent of the top 100 companies the audit committee is
exclusively comprised of independent, non-executive directors.14
Moving still deeper into the heart of the problem, it is apparent that HIH
altogether lacked an identifiable long-term strategy and, accordingly,
developed only opportunistically. The company’s decision to re-enter the US
market typifies this, premised as it was upon purely anecdotal evidence and
following a well-reasoned strategic decision to withdraw from the market only
a few years earlier. The decision to purchase FAI without due diligence,15 the
expansion into the UK market and the Allianz joint venture – a woeful
decision with patently predictable yet thoroughly crippling effects on HIH’s
vital, insurance-premium income stream16 – offer further examples.

12

Report prepared for HIH Royal Commission by Institutional Analysis Pty Ltd, cited
in Philomena Leung and Barry Cooper, ‘The Mad Hatter’s Corporate Tea Party’
(2002) 18(6) Managerial Auditing Journal Iss 6/7 505.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid. Independence problems also plagued the audit committee of Harris Scarfe: the
committee comprised only three members, two of whom were clearly internal including the chief financial officer, Alan Hodgson. Such lack of independence
completely undermines the audit committee function of ensuring efficient and
effective communication between senior management and the external auditors.
15
Although very much alive to the difficulties of ‘persuading a takeover target to open
its books to a suitor who is also a competitor’, the Commission noted that the takeover
decision was reached after only a perfunctory meeting and was catalysed by fears that
a third party’s bid was imminent: Royal Commission Report, ‘Mismanagement: A
failure of culture’.
16
The joint-venture agreement required not only that HIH contribute approximately
$500 million to a joint venture trust but that its premium income be paid into that
trust, to become available for distribution only on a quarterly basis and following
actuarial assessment. With sardonic understatement, the Commission noted that it was
‘somewhat bewildering’ that no one at management or board level even called for an
accurate analysis of the likely cash flow implications of the transaction: Royal
Commission Report, ‘The harbinger of doom: The Allianz joint-venture’.
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B

Deceit

Whilst it is certainly possible to identify specific, catalytic transactions, these
individual decisions merely implicate more fundamental, underlying
deficiencies in the ‘corporate culture’ and structure of the HIH group itself.
The Commission noted that ‘the board – the ultimate decision maker – could
rely on management and the auditors only if it was satisfied that the accounts
had been derived from systems that would likely produce accurate returns
after diligent search and inquiry into relevant and material matters’.17
However, the information systems at HIH ‘left much to be desired’, with the
result that management itself was ‘often flying blind’.18 Worse, ‘there was a
filtering of information such that, on occasions, bad news reached the board
only if it could not be avoided’.19 As is so often the case, this deception was
effected with the complicity of unscrupulous accounting: ‘put bluntly, HIH
management recognised that the group was under-performing at a level that
could not be sustained … it used and relied on questionable transactions
giving rise to doubtful accounting entries, which disguised the seriousness of
the situation … the process was fatally flawed’.20 Such entries included
extensive one-off entries by way of increments to goodwill and recoveries
under reinsurance contracts.21 In the Commission's view, accounting practices
became ‘a repository of the unpleasant’.
In such an environment, one might reasonably ask: where were the auditors?
III
A

THE AUDITORS

Lack of professional scepticism

Unquestionably, the HIH story is also one of auditor failure. Although the
extent to which Andersen's failures were ultimately causative of the group's
collapse is necessarily speculative, it is informative to note that between 1998
and 2001 the firm had employed a client-risk assessment mechanism (dubbed
‘SMART’) that had consistently assessed HIH as a maximum-risk client.22 Its

17

Royal Commission Report, ‘The accounting function’.
Royal Commission Report, ‘The integrity of information sources’.
19
Ibid.
20
Royal Commission Report, ‘Aggressive accounting practices’.
21
The desire to mask problems could be seen also at board level, the fateful Allianz
joint-venture being announced as a ‘value enhancing strategy’ only the day before the
presentation of HIH’s very poor end-of-year results: ibid.
22
Royal Commission Report, ‘21.3 Audit approach’.
18
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internal operations manual accordingly required the firm to employ expanded
risk management procedures and to formulate a formal risk management plan
in this respect.23 Given the extremely high materiality of any potential
misstatement in relation to the provision for future claims, Andersen's own
policies required that the reports of the consulting actuary be subject to
rigorous review. Remarkably, however, the firm ‘generally relied on extracts
from six monthly reports that Slee [the principal consulting actuary] prepared
… which were received before the finalisation of the year-end accounts’ and
which ‘generally speaking … provided scant detail as to Slee’s methodology
and assumptions’.24 Moreover, the firm did not engage any expert assistance
in considering these extracts.25
Whilst Andersen's unquestioning acceptance of the actuary's reports was
arguably the firm's principal failure, it formed merely an aspect of an overall
lack of inquisitive rigour. In particular, Andersen relied extensively upon
HIH's internal business audit processes. Indeed, the firm relied on those
processes without conducting any evaluation or testing of the operations,
policies and procedures of internal audit function,26 – even though the audit
team had identified deficiencies in the internal audit division and even though
Andersen's own operations manual mandated such evaluation and testing.27
B

‘Aggressive accounting practices’ 28

The firm also failed to deal with a number of accounting anomalies. These
were identified by the Royal Commission as falling into four main categories,
namely: accounting for future income-tax benefits, deferred acquisition costs,
deferred information technology costs and goodwill.
In the case of future income-tax benefits, the relevant accounting standard
makes plain that, where a company incurs a tax loss, significant doubts must
arise about the company's ability to realise the related future income-tax

23

Quite apart from Andersen’s internal manual, this is a requirement of AUS 206.
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Indeed, Andersen did not even perform a review of the audit division’s working
papers: Royal Commission Report, ‘21.3.1 Audit methodology: Reliance on the work
of others’.
27
Again, this was also a requirement auditing standards (AUS 604).
28
This is how the Royal Commission euphemistically branded HIH’s accounting
methodology: Royal Commission Report, ‘Aggressive accounting practices’.
24
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benefits in subsequent periods.29 Although a ‘virtual certainty’ test is posited,
Andersen's engagement partner testified that he applied the far less exacting
test of whether there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe that HIH would
continue to operate profitably in the future’. In the Commission's view, the
auditor failed to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence under AUS 502 and
should have issued a qualified opinion.
A similar story can be told in relation to the accounting for deferred
acquisition costs. Before acquisition costs incurred in obtaining and recording
policies of insurance can be deferred and recognised as assets, they must be
capable of reliable measurement and must more likely than not give rise to
premium revenue in subsequent financial years.30 In this case, Andersen did
no work with respect to the recoverability of deferred acquisition costs,
relying instead, ‘as a matter of professional judgement’, upon HIH's historical
profitability.31 Again, insufficient evidence was obtained under AUS 502.
Although at the time there were no specific accounting standards relevant to
deferred information technology costs, Statement of Accounting Concepts 4
(SAC 4) posited a test comparable to that for deferred acquisition costs –
namely, that the future economic benefits be both probable and reliably
measurable. Again, the Commission questioned whether Andersen obtained
sufficient appropriate evidence in this respect.
Significant questions were also raised with respect to Andersen's accounting
for goodwill. Again, the test is whether future benefits will eventuate and
whether goodwill can be measured reliably.32 As at June 2000, goodwill
represented a staggering 50 percent of HIH's shareholder funds. This
compares with 4.9 percent for QBE Insurance and 0.4 percent for NRMA.33
The extent to which the diabolical Allianz transaction can be attributed to
auditor failure is not without controversy. Andersen was supplied only basic
details of the transaction. Moreover, it is not the role of the auditor to presage
the commercial prudence of a client's business decisions. However, any
financial report must entail an assessment of an entity's ability to continue to
operate as a going concern; the truth and fairness of this assessment was one
falling squarely within the audit function. In this respect, the Commission

29

AASB 1020
AASB 1023.
31
Royal Commission Report, ‘21.5.5 Deferred acquisition costs’.
32
AASB 1013
33
Royal Commission Report, ‘Reliance on intangibles’.
30
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again found that Andersen displayed a lack of professional scepticism:
‘Andersen exhibited a willingness to embrace the Allianz transaction as a
panacea in respect of a number of critical and fundamental audit issues in the
2000 audit without obtaining sufficient analytical evidence about the
transaction and its potential financial consequences’.34
C

Independence?

The independence of Andersen was also highly questionable. Three former
partners of the firm sat on the HIH board. One, who was the recipient of
continuing benefits from Andersen, was made chairman and was appointed to
the audit committee only 17 months after his retirement. Another, who had
been the engagement partner, was made chief financial officer only the day
after his resignation from the firm. The third was appointed to the board only
five months after his retirement, having ‘played a significant role in the audit
of HIH for 25 years’.35 Moreover, in 1999 Andersen's longstanding HIH-audit
engagement partner was replaced after he met with non-executive directors in
the absence of senior management.
Highlighting Andersen's close personal relationships to HIH and its
unquestioning acceptance of the results of both the company’s internal audit
processes and the work of its consulting actuary, counsel assisting the
Commission mounted an extremely cogent argument to the effect that
Andersen was not, in fact, independent in its conduct of the 1999 and 2000
audits. The point was also made that Andersen's partners were under
considerable pressure to maximise profits through the provision of non-audit
services.36 Indeed, one of the Andersen partners stated in evidence before the
Commission that, if he was called upon to exercise independent and
professional scepticism by resisting management proposals, it would have
adversely affected his ability to promote the supply of non-audit services to
HIH.37 Notwithstanding the considerable probity of the counsel’s

34

Royal Commission Report, ‘21.6.3 Conclusion’ (this section constituting the
conclusion to a chapter entitled ‘The Audit Function’). The Commission had ‘serious
doubts’ whether the group accounts for 1999 and 2000 could probably have been
prepared on a going concern basis: ibid.
35
Royal Commission Report, ‘7.2.3 Audit independence - employment situations’.
36
One of the ‘cornerstones’ in the evaluation of the performance of Andersen partners
and staff was the success and facilitating the use of non audit services: Royal
Commission Report, ‘21.4.5 Fee maximisation’.
37
Ibid.
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submissions, the Commission found a lack of independence only in
appearance, not in fact.38
IV

REFORM

Although certainly the largest collapse, the demise of HIH was only one of a
number of high profile and dramatic failures. Others included Harris Scarfe
and One.Tel. Harris Scarfe's chief financial officer, Alan Hodgson, is
currently serving a sentence of six years for having played a leading role in
the falsification of company accounts and reports, thereby allowing the
company to trade when it was virtually insolvent. Indeed, in testimony before
the Supreme Court of South Australia, Hodgson stated that he had effectively
authorised accounts to be changed on cue to comply with profit results
stipulated by either the company's managing director or its chairman.39
Similarly, One.Tel’s strategic decision to invest in its own
telecommunications system wrought such financial strain that ultimately its
accounts were manipulated in order to hide losses (principally through the
conversion of expenses into capital expenditure) and to ensure that ‘unreal
salaries and bonuses would continue to be paid’.40 Unsurprisingly, recent
reforms have sought to bolster principles of corporate governance, improve
the quality of financial reporting and improve audit quality, particularly
through measures aimed at safeguarding auditor independence. These reforms
were effected via the passage of the Corporate Law Economic Reform
Programme (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act (‘the CLERP 9
Act’) on 25 June 2004.
A

Tweaking corporate governance

On the corporate governance side, the reforms require, inter alia, chief
executive officers and chief financial officers of listed companies to declare in
the annual report that the financial records have been properly maintained,
comply with accounting standards and ‘give a true and fair view’.41 Listed

38

In reaching this conclusion and after traversing in considerable detail the various
possible tests for the requisite standard of ‘perceived independence’, the Commission
applied by analogy the test of judicial independence: to an informed observer, ‘could’
the circumstances surrounding the audit engagement give rise to a perception of
partiality: Royal Commission Report, ‘Other models for dealing with conflict’.
39
Philomena Leung and Barry Cooper, ‘The Mad Hatter’s Corporate Tea Party’
(2002) 18(6) Managerial Auditing Journal Iss. 6/7 505.
40
Ibid.
41
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 259A.
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companies must also include details of directors’ remuneration, as well as
performance targets for directors.42 Shareholders must be given time to
discuss those targets at annual stockholders meetings.43 Institutional investors
will therefore be able to decide whether financial targets are sufficiently high
and whether or not they were reached before executive bonuses were paid.44
Management discussion and analysis too is now mandatory in the financial
reports of listed companies: shareholders are to receive such information as
they ‘would reasonably require’ to make an informed assessment of ‘the
operations of the entity’, its financial position and its ‘business strategies and
prospects for future financial years’.45 Following recommendations of the
HIH Royal Commission which highlighted inadequacies in identifying
company office-holders, individual liability under the Corporations Act is
now determined on the basis of function rather than title or position.46 A
Financial Reporting Panel, vested with the power to summon witnesses and to
take evidence,47 has also been established to rule on disputes arising between
a company and the corporate regulator, ASIC.48 The passage of CLERP 9 also
introduced whistleblower protection designed to encourage employees to
report suspected breaches of the Corporations Act.49 Perhaps the most
dramatic reforms, however, have been in the area of auditor independence.

42

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 300A(1)(b).
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 250SA. Shareholders’ views are not, however,
binding upon directors: s 250R.
44
Alan Kohler, ‘New Rules will Show which Master Chiefs Serve’, The West
Australian, 7 August 2004, 65.
45
S229A.
46
See, eg, s 295A (containing a definition of the ‘chief executive function’ and ‘chief
financial officer function’ for the purpose of determining liability for the additional
declarations now required in the financial reports of listed entities).
47
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 239CE.
48
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 239AA. The notion of such a panel was proposed by
ASIC due to fears that the courts would adopt inappropriate, legalistic interpretations
of accounting standards. The regulator pursued the concept after it received an
adverse judgement on a matter involving software developer MYOB: ‘Coming to
terms with CLERP 9’, (July 2004) The Accountant 2. The establishment of the
Financial Reporting Panel has been generally applauded, although some have argued
that its jurisdiction is too limited: the panel is restricted to ruling only on disputes that
arise after a company has published its accounts and where ASIC asserts that there
has been non-compliance with accounting standards: ‘CLERP 9 disputes panel
reforms attacked as being inadequate’, The Accountant, October 2003, 1.
49
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317AE (contained in an entirely new part of the
Corporations Act 2001: Part 9.4AAA - Protection for Whistleblowers).
43
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B

The independence requirements

Prior to recent reforms, the Corporations Act dealt with the issue of auditor
independence by focusing on specific indicia of objectivity, such as
indebtedness and employment relationships between the company and its
auditor. Now, however, the Act enshrines ‘Professional Statement F1’, an
independence standard developed and adopted by the profession itself.50 The
standard requires auditors to identify specific threats to independence and to
apply safeguards reducing them to an acceptable level: it is now an offence
under the Corporations Act for auditors aware of a conflict of interest
situation to fail to ‘take all reasonable steps to ensure that [the situation]
ceases to exist’.51 Auditors unaware of a conflict situation will still be caught
if they failed to operate ‘a quality control system reasonably capable of
making the individual auditor or audit company aware of the existence of [the
situation]’.52 Similar liability attaches to directors of audited companies.
Indeed, it is an offence for even an employee of an audit firm, whether
associated with the engagement or not, to fail to notify ASIC within seven
days of a known conflict.53 Auditors must now also provide written
declarations that there have been no contraventions of the auditor
independence requirements of the Corporations Act or of ‘any applicable code
of professional conduct’54– failure to do so constitutes a strict liability
offence.55 The independence requirements are extremely convoluted, even
including ‘maximum hours tests’ (that vary depending upon the level of audit
involvement) for the provision of non-audit services. Directors’ statements on
annual reports must detail any non-audit services provided by an external
auditor, including fees paid for such services, and provide an explanation as to
why the audit committee is satisfied that the provision of the services does not
compromise independence. As Senator Ian Campbell said in releasing the
draft bill for discussion, ‘we’re going to give the standard the force of law by
saying to companies that if you depart from F1, you will have to explain in
your annual report why’.56
50

F1 was developed by the International Federation of Accountants and is applied in
Australia under the ICAA and CPAA’s Joint Code of Professional Conduct.
51
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 324CA(1).
52
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 324CA(2).
53
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 324CA(1A).
54
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 307C(1)(c).
55
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 307C(3).
56
Mark Abernethy, ‘Campbell’s law’, (November 2002) 73(10) CA Charter 34.
Although significant, this measure falls short of United States’ reforms which, by
virtue of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, impose a blanket prohibition on the provision of
non-audit services by an external auditor. In the view of HIH Royal Commission,
there was a ‘respectable argument’ in favour of a blanket prohibition also in Australia,

148

DEAKIN LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 11 NO 2

Further independence requirements impose restrictions on the composition of
the audit team. The audit partner, and other personnel who ‘play a significant
role’ (the meaning of which is defined, along with other nebulous terms such
as ‘audit critical employee’57) in the audit of listed companies must be rotated
every five years.58 Once rolled off, such personnel cannot return to an
engagement for at least two years.59 Further restrictions bolster these
requirements. No more than one former ex-partner of an external auditor can
be appointed to the directorship or senior management of a former audit
client.60 Moreover, audit and review partners are unable to accept such
appointments for a period of two years following resignation.61
C

The watchdogs and standard-setters

The CLERP 9 Act has also wrought significant institutional changes,
particularly within the Financial Reporting Council. The FRC has traditionally
been responsible for overseeing the accounting standards-setting processes of
the private and public sectors; its role has been advisory, being the key policy
adviser to government on accounting standards and determining the broader,
strategic direction of the standard-setter itself, the Australian Accounting
Standards Board. This role has now been considerably expanded in deference
to recommendations by Professor Ian Ramsay in his report to the Federal
Government on corporate-governance reforms (the acclaimed ‘Ramsay
report’). Professor Ramsay urged the establishment of an auditing and
accounting public oversight board. Ultimately, however, government came to
the view that ‘the FRC was virtually the same as what Professor Ramsay was

particularly due to the ‘pressure upon the audit personnel to procure non-audit work
by maintaining a strong relationship with management’: Royal Commission Report,
‘7.2.2 Audit independence – non-audit work’. Ultimately, however, the Commission
supported the draft bill on the strength of a further recommendation to the effect that
the marketing of non-audit services ought ‘form no part of the performance evaluation
criteria for audit partners and personnel’: ibid.
57
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 9.
58
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 324DA(1).
59
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 324DA(1)(a).
60
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 324CK.
61
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 324CI. These reforms all follow recommendations
for additional protections made by the HIH Royal Commission. Professional standard
F1 and the Ramsay Report had both subscribed to a seven-year rotation period for
partners only. However, the Commission also recommended ‘cooling off’ periods of
four years following resignation for ‘senior audit personnel’ and two years only for a
‘former partner not directly involved in the audit’: Royal Commission Report,
‘Recommendations’.
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suggesting’ and that, with a revised mandate and in a reconstituted form, the
Council could be ‘established as the pre-eminent public oversight board for
audit and accounting’.62 Consequently, the audit standard-setter, the Auditing
& Assurance Standards Board (AuASB)63, now also falls within the purview
of the FRC.64 This is of especial significance because, as a result of further
reform, auditing standards set by the AuASB now have legislative backing:
under s307A, it is a strict liability offence to conduct an audit other than in
accordance with the Board’s auditing standards.65 Moreover, the advisory
function of the FRC is supplemented by a compliance role. In conjunction
with the professional bodies, the FRC is to monitor both auditor independence
and audit quality.66 In furtherance of this function, the FRC will have the
power to gather information from professional accounting bodies and
accounting firms, including audit working papers67 (which must be retained
for at least seven years68). These powers will override any claims to client
confidentiality.69
The primary corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC), is also to monitor compliance with auditing standards
and independence requirements. To this end, the Commission has received a
funding increase of some $74 million over the past two budgets70 and has
announced a comprehensive two-year Audit Surveillance Project.71 Under this
project, ASIC will select companies both randomly and using risk-based
methodologies. Non-compliance with relevant accounting standards

62

Senator Ian Campbell, quoted in ‘Campbell's law’, above n 56.
The AuASB is itself newly constituted under s227B.
64
‘In performing its functions, the AUASB must… follow the broader strategic
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constitutes one of the applicable risk criteria.72 The first year commenced in
October 2004 and focused upon F1 independence: it entailed on-site
inspections of 440 auditing and small accounting firms to ensure
implementation of ‘systems to ensure independence’.73 In the second year,
ASIC will ‘expand the programme to cover audit firms with a smaller
numbers of listed company clients’ and ‘over time, will cover all audit firms
on a systematic basis’.74 The Commission proposes examining individual
engagements ‘only if there is a problem identified through our other
surveillance activities’.75
ASIC's responsibility for audit quality assurance extends also to mandating
the educational requirements for official registration as a company auditor.76
Registrants must either complete specialist courses that are stipulated by way
of regulation or meet ASIC-approved competency standards.77
Further still, in a somewhat radical step that has not been implemented
anywhere else in the world (including the United States) the Commission now
has the power to issue infringement notices for alleged market-disclosure
breaches.78 The power was one sought by ASIC itself: ‘from time to time,
some companies are not giving as much emphasis to their obligations to the
market as we think is required … we argued for a remedy that was
proportionate and able to be used quickly, as an alternative to very expensive
litigation’.79
The expanded role of the FRC has naturally required some settling of turf
with ASIC. Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding signed in June
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2004, ASIC will continue to be principally responsible for ‘surveillance,
investigation and enforcement of the responsibilities of companies in relation
to financial reporting’, including ‘the enforcement of auditor independence
requirements’ of the Corporations Act.80 ASIC will provide the FRC with
details of its quality assurance review processes and will keep the Council
abreast of disciplinary proceedings. For its part, the FRC will focus more on
‘monitoring and assessing the nature and overall adequacy of the auditor
independence arrangements’, with its evidence-gathering powers being used
to ‘order related disclosure’.81
V
A

TOKENISM OR EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES?
More than tokenism

The above reforms are clearly not mere criticism-deflecting adjustments
pitched by the accounting profession in a desperate bid to cling to selfregulation. Indeed, principally through the Institute of Chartered Accountants
of Australia, the profession opposed many of them.82 The ‘vast majority of
submissions, apart from ASIC’,83 were strongly opposed to giving auditing
standards the force of law: ‘auditing standards are already enforceable by
ASIC through the Company Auditors & Liquidators Disciplinary Board’.84 In
a similar vein, the ICAA was ‘disappointed’ that the CLERP 9 bill failed to
augur a greater role for the Financial Reporting Panel in resolving genuine
standard-compliance issues prior to the publication of accounts.85 The
Institute also had reservations as to the potential scope of a reconstituted FRC:
‘it should be made clear that it is only oversight, with the detailed monitoring
of auditors continuing to be subject to the independent quality review
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programs of the accounting bodies’.86 On the crucial issue of auditor
independence, the Institute took the position that ‘the independence of the
auditor is vital, but independence is not the objective itself’.87 In building on
this argument, the ICAA voiced concern at, inter alia, the legislature’s
preference for micro-managing, technical detail rather than ‘appropriate
independence standards’ and at the ‘intrusive cooling-off period for
professional staff not intimately engaged in audits’.88
B

Effectiveness: A question of costs and benefits

Although the CLERP 9 Act firms-up on corporate disclosure requirements, it
is the illegalisation of non-compliance with auditing standards and
independence requirements that are its dominant features. The independence
requirements entail some of the most convoluted and ornate legislative
drafting to have graced Australia's statute books. The prospect of actually
pursuing charges for non-compliance would make a prosecutor shudder. Yet,
notwithstanding the profession's protestations otherwise, criminalisation will
doubtless have a strong deterrent effect: professional persons might
reasonably be assumed to be peculiarly sensitive to the stigma and
reputational fallout attendant upon any conviction.
Weighing-in against deterrent theory, however, are those who point out the
costs of complying with the new regime. Because of likely costs, the Financial
Sector Advisory Council had long argued against an ‘overreaction to scandals
such as the HIH collapse’.89 As it happens, however, the Australian Financial
Review now estimates that the top 50 listed companies face a combined
annual compliance cost of $375 million.90 The Australian Bankers
Association has estimated that the compliance costs for big banks would
likely increase by $125 million – an increase of 20 percent.91 In a survey of 69
large international employers operating in Australia, over 40 percent
acknowledged that they had not adequately budgeted for the additional costs,
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most pointing to additional measures rendered necessary by the requirement
that the chief executive officer and chief financial officer sign-off on their
internal control systems.92
The extreme emphasis placed upon auditor independence is odd given that
lack of auditor independence, although identified, was not specifically
implicated as causative of the disasters that sparked these reforms. As
discussed above, in the case of HIH there was no actual lack of independence,
merely the existence of circumstances which, applying the stringent test
adopted by the Commission, could have given rise to a perception of
partiality.93 This raises another point: even assuming a need for radical reform
in the area of auditor independence, it is most peculiar that the CLERP Act
fails to impose the stringent independence test so cogently advocated by the
Commission. Under s324CD, a ‘conflict of interest situation’ exists either
where ‘objective and impartial judgement in relation to the conduct of the
audit’ is not possible or where a reasonable person ‘would conclude’ that such
judgement is not possible (emphasis added). The difference between the two
formulations is far from semantic: the Commission’s test precludes the mere
possibility of perceived impartiality whereas the second limb of the test in s
324CD tolerates it. Moreover, as was specifically noted by the Commission,
finding evidence of actual bias is extremely problematic; invariably, resort
must be made to the second limb: perceived bias. Any relaxation of the
standard imposed by this second limb strikes at the very core of the
independence requirement. As is attested by the move towards international
standardisation of accounting and auditing standards, confidence in financial
reporting is essential to market efficiency. It is difficult to fathom why the
Australian Government, as part of a wholesale revamp of auditor
independence, should ultimately set a standard that permits marketplace
uncertainty.
The issue of appropriate standard aside, the auditor independence
requirements are likely to manifest more profoundly than simply through
increased compliance costs. To minimise risk, many of the larger accounting
firms have already hived-off their consulting arms and are refocusing on the
more traditional activities of auditing, accounting and provision of tax
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advice.94 For smaller practices, ‘it may well be that, because of those same
risks and the heavy professional indemnity insurance burden, some who
trained as accountants will move away from the statutory areas and into
business consulting’.95 For this reason, CPA Australia was vocal in its
criticism of the CLERP 9 bill, noting that listed companies vary greatly in size
and that the legislation’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is ‘significantly different
to the corporate law frameworks of other countries, where size tests are used
to differentiate requirements’.96 Further, the ICAA interestingly inferred that
the five-year maximum for audit engagement and review rotation might
ultimately institutionalise an independence threat:
When regard is had to the smaller audit firms and those audits that are
conducted in other than Sydney and Melbourne, there is a real concern that a
five-year period will be difficult to comply with and will result in both a
move to the larger audit firms and a concentration of listed company audits
in Sydney and Melbourne.97

The business community has voiced its own misgivings about being forced to
‘buy what is perceived as independent advice, but may not be the best
possible advice’:98
Independence is now something at the forefront of everybody's mind. One
classic example is the move to international accounting standards. Who do
you go to? Do we go with our auditor[?]… Who else can you get advice
from? Let us go to another one of the Big Four competitors which doesn’t
know much about us and which has been trying to get into us, whereas the
external auditor would have more knowledge and be able to help better, that
would be a classic independence-impairing situation.99
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Most fundamentally, there is much force in the argument that excessive
legislation is apt to result in compliance that is merely technical, rather than
ethical:
The old concept of form over substance still reigns supreme. As in the past,
the authors of future audit reports will still be trying to ensure that the look
of those reports complies, or appears to comply, with what the legislation
demands. Our legislators … conveniently ignored the fact that where form
can be impressive, it is meaningless if there is no substance.100

The crucial area of debate over the CLERP 9 discussion paper related,
perhaps predictably, to the issue of whether reform should tend towards
‘black-letter law’, in which all requisite measures are given the force of law,
or ‘fuzzy regulation’, in which state agencies and the professional bodies are
left to ensure compliance with overarching standards. Given its advocacy of
‘spot fines’,101 the force-of-law argument naturally found favour with ASIC.
In its response to the CLERP 9 discussion paper, ASIC pointed to deficiencies
in the Companies Auditors & Liquidators Disciplinary Board's operations and
penalties structure, opining that the prospect of auditor deregistration was an
inadequate compliance incentive.102 As has already been noted, however,
ASIC was virtually alone in its push for force-of-law reform.
Placing auditing standards under the supervision of the FRC and treating them
as delegated legislation with the force of law has a simplistic appeal: this is
how the accounting standards are administered. Against this, however, it is
argued that cementing standards in legislation ‘runs the risk of derailing the
momentum towards global harmonisation of auditing standards’103: ‘fines will
provide little extra in improving performance and will … undermine much of
the good that has been achieved in recent years in global standards setting’.104
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The more vociferous proponents of fuzzy regulation argue that there was little
need for reform at all, positing that ‘the reforms introduced in Australia in
response to corporate malfeasance in the 1980s appear to have held up under
pressure’105 and that black-letter law is ‘often only a roadmap for the
unscrupulous, as was demonstrated in the Enron off-balance-sheet
transactions’.106 Fuzzy regulation, in contrast, ‘tends to encourage companies
and people to lift their gaze from regulatory minimums to the principles
involved’:107
It is arguably vital that Australia maintains a principled-based approach to
regulation and self-regulation. As noted by Bartholomeusz (2002), in making
technical compliance with the law less of an issue than compliance with its
spirit, the Australian system has offered scope for good governance and
practice to evolve and respond to the corporate environment and community
expectations.108

Other commentators have expressed similar views:
Of particular concern is the way in which the draughtsmen responsible for
putting together CLERP 9 have given auditing standards the force of law. If
one combines this and the breadth of auditing standards with the oversight
role of the FRC and the enforcement role and responsibilities of ASIC, we
could end up with an environment that will be nearly as prescriptive and
detailed as that now in place in the US …It is unlikely that it up would add
sufficient benefit to outweigh the significant costs of compliance that it
would involve.109

In a detailed treatment of recent corporate collapses in Australia and the
United States, Leung and Cooper draw on a body of American sociological
and social-psychological research in arguing that, although lack of effective
corporate governance is generally implicated, ‘the relationship between
materialism and corporate collapses has been largely overlooked by the
numerous corporate governance recommendations, which merely scratch the
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surface of the problems’.110 At the end of the day, it is simply not possible to
legislate against materiality and greed:
[W]hile the mountain of black-letter law keeps increasing, as regulations
become more intrusive, as prospectuses become crammed with more and
more information (with the meeting of mounting official requirements
creating the false impression of added security), the corporate collapses keep
on getting bigger and directorial fraud gets worse, demonstrating that you
cannot legislate for integrity.111

VI

CONCLUSION: A NEED TO RESURRECT THE ‘TRUE AND FAIR VIEW’

HIH showed just how easy it was to fool the regulator and the market for a
time. Ray Williams craved the market's favour and went to extraordinary
lengths to get good coverage from stockbrokers' analysts. Those whose views
he disagreed with, he refused to talk to. Eventually the fiddles and tweaking
mounted to the point where they broke the company. HIH was juggling so
many balls in the air – overstating reserves, heavy use of financial
reinsurance, intangibles accounting for 85% of net assets, and growing losses
in the UK and US, at a time the Australian dollar was falling. These factors
built so dramatically over 1999 and 2000, that all the massaging HIH could
muster could not cover the impending disaster.112
Almost without exception, each of the recent high-profile corporate collapses,
both here in Australia and the United States, entailed gross deception of the
investing public through highly shonky, technical accounting.113 Yet
compliance with accepted accounting standards is merely one, indeed a
subordinate, aspect of the auditor’s certification: ultimately, financial reports
must present a ‘true and fair view’. Unfortunately, as Professors of
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Accounting Graeme Dean and Frank Clarke argue, the import of the ‘true and
fair’ criterion in Australia has long been undermined in that ‘accountants have
been schooled in the belief that the primary criterion for a ‘true and fair view’
was that the result complied with accounting standards – the so-called
technical interpretation.’114 This may change. Pre-reform, the Corporations
Act required directors to explain if the criterion was not met. Under the
CLERP 9 Act, directors are now required to explain if they believe that
compliance with the accounting standards does not present a true and fair
view. Moreover, if additional information is considered necessary to provide a
true and fair view, directors must explain why.115
Dean and Clarke posit that these changes ‘put far more focus on the true and
fair criterion’.116 If so, then the legislature was extremely coy in its
amendments – particularly when compared with its expansive
pronouncements on auditor independence. Given that the very purpose of
publishing financial reports is to edify the investing public – and given the
demonstrated propensity of corporate malfeasors to exploit the accounting
profession’s arcane vernacular and methodologies – this is a great shame.
Much more could have been done. Most fundamentally, guidance could have
been provided to directors, auditors and regulators as to what, actually,
constitutes a ‘true and fair view’:
Whilst we like to argue that our approach to financial reporting is
conceptual, whereas the US approach is menu or rule driven … the truth is
that in practice our approach is also rule driven and we do not often avail
ourselves of the conceptual approach which is embodied in the true and fair
view that our system allows. As more and more rules have been developed,
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less and less attention has been given to the true and fair requirement, to the
extent that young auditors would no longer really know how to apply it.117

Re-establishing the ‘true and fair view’ as the ultimate reporting criterion
would go a long way toward deflecting criticisms that the CLERP 9
amendments impose a black-letter regime offering only a ‘roadmap for the
unscrupulous’. Yet even its universal and unwavering application could never
redress unscrupulous conduct per se:
As a result of the searching inquiries of the Royal Commission into the HIH
collapse, we now know some of the devices HIH management used to trick its
auditor, the regulator and its own directors. The executives involved knew
what they were doing was wrong, yet they did it. No system of regulation can
rule against behaviour like this.118
Perhaps with apprehensions otherwise, the Australian Government has
unfortunately imposed a regime that is not only costly to implement but which
tends towards technical rather than ethical compliance and which, in the
process, misses two crucial targets: a standard of auditor independence that is
intolerant of even the perception of impartiality and a financial disclosure
criterion that punishes deception of the investing public.
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